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Abstract
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum
games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory.
Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in
which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our ex-
periment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how
social preferences, presentation e¤ects and belief elicitation procedures may inu-
ence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the di¤erences
we observe with respect to previous work.
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1 Introduction
A substantial portion of the experimental literature shows that game-theoretical predictions
do not work well in the laboratory, even when the games played are very simple.1 This is
particularly true when subjects play games for the rst time without previous experience.
However, rst time behaviour is crucial to model a vast number of economic situations which
are not repeated, and it helps to identify strategic principles that may be obscured by con-
vergence in repeated play.2 A natural question is to identify the class of games for which
game theory predicts well when games are played for the rst time and the reasons why it
might fail in other games.
We aim to contribute to this question by studying play and rst order beliefs in simple
but non-trivial games with similarities to others for which experimental evidence is more
negative. In particular, we study two-player 3x3 constant sum normal form games with
unique equilibria in pure strategies and with di¤erent number of rounds of iterated deletion
of (strictly) dominated strategies necessary to reach the Nash equilibrium. We show that
in this class of games, game theory predicts subjects behaviour better than in previous
experiments and we discuss the relation of our results with previous work.
For simple games with unique pure strategy equilibria, experimental evidence is not con-
clusive. While in 2x2 repeated games equilibrium play has found substantial support (McCabe
et al. (1994), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994)), in games with more than two strategies for
each subject and no possibility of learning equilibrium predictions start to fail. Stahl and
Wilson (1995) found equilibrium compliance rates of 68% in 3x3 games with three rounds of
dominance solvability. However, Broseta, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2001) obtain in 2x3
games with three rounds of deletion of dominated strategies to reach equilibrium or with no
dominated strategies equilibrium compliance rates ranging from 11% to 28%. For 4x4, 5x5
and 6x6 repeated games, the evidence is even more negative (Brown and Rosenthal (1990),
Rapapport and Boebel (1992), Mookherjee and Sopher (1997)). Thus, choosing 3x3 games
with di¤erent numbers of rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies we may nd
reasons why game theory loses its predictive power when some characteristics of the games,
like the number of actions subjects can make, are changed.
Our results are surprisingly di¤erent from Costa-Gomes andWeizsäcker (2004), who found
low rates of compliance with equilibrium predictions (35%), low frequency assigned to equi-
librium beliefs by opponents and low percentage of best response behaviour in a similar
experiment. Our design di¤ers in three key aspects: 1) Our games are constant sum, 2)
We elicited beliefs asking about frequencies of play, not probabilities and 3) Payo¤s were
represented by single-digit numbers. All three changes may be behind our results.
1For example, see Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), Kagel and Roth (1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995),
Broseta, Costa-Gomes and Crwaford (2001), Binmore et al. (2002), Crawford (2002) and Goeree and Holt
(2004).
2Crawford (2002) argues that by foregoing repetition as a teaching device, one-shot experiments place a
heavier burden on subjectsunderstanding, with a premium on simplicity and clarity of design.
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First, in constant sum games, game theory makes condent predictions since the Nash
Equilibrium outcome coincides with Minimax (and Maximin). Binmore et al. (2001) laments
how little experimental research has been done on constant sum games being the branch
of game theory with the most solid theoretical foundations. Previous research on constant
sum games3 has focused on whether subjectsfrequencies of play in repeated games coincide
with the probabilities with which subjects should play the one-shot mixed equilibria and the
results have been negative. Here we o¤er reassurance on Von Neumanns (1928) Minimax
Theorem for one shot games with unique equilibrium in pure strategies, although we cannot
separate Minimax or Maximin from Nash reasoning.
We also choose to study constant sum games because, on a theoretical level, behaviour
should not be a¤ected by distributional and e¢ ciency concerns. E¢ ciency concerns should
not matter since subjects payo¤s always add up to the same amount, no matter which
actions are chosen. Distributional concerns should not a¤ect behaviour as long as subjects
care more for their own payo¤s than for those of others.4 On the other hand, this seems
counter-intuitive.5 In constant sum games all strategic behaviour refers to how to distribute
a pie of a given size and thus, how fair the distribution is should matter to subjects with
distributional concerns. Of these preconceptions, a natural one is that, everything else equal,
subjects should get equal shares. Therefore, whether it is feasible to equally split payo¤s or
not, may have an inuence on play. Our design allows us to study these questions.
Second, when subjects are asked about rst order beliefs directly, it is crucial to elicit
them in a meaningful manner that subjects can understand. Kahneman and Tversky (1973),
express doubts on whether subjects can quantify their beliefs and even if they are, they might
nd some form of processing quantitative beliefs more meaningful than others. We follow
Gigerenzer (2000, 2002) in eliciting beliefs by asking about frequencies of play by a pool of
subjects instead of asking about probabilities of a single action chosen by a single opponent
as it is frequently done.6 This may make beliefs more meaningful when subjects only choose
once in each game.
Eliciting beliefs allows us to study the degrees of complexity with which individuals are
able to play games. We explicitly designed our games to discriminate equilibrium behaviour
from other models assuming subjects have di¤erent degrees of cognitive complexity. Although
this is a complex issue, these models approximate subjectssophistication to whether they
are able to best response to their beliefs about opponentsplay and whether they form those
beliefs anticipating opponents may also be strategical. Thus, they dene the rst degree
of depth of reasoning (L1) as best responding to believing opponents choose their actions
randomly and dene higher degrees of depth as best responding to believing opponents are one
degree less sophisticated than themselves. We specically design our games to obtain strong
separation between these models predictions and we nd that the equilibrium prediction
3Rapapport and Boebel (1992), McCabe et al. (1994), Mookherjee and Sopher (1997), Walker and Wooders
(2001), ONeill (1987) and Binmore et al. (2001)
4Camerer et al. (1998).
5And in particular there is ample evidence that it is not satied by Dictator Game data.
6McKelvey and Page (1990), O¤erman et al (1996), Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2004).
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clearly outperforms these models.
An alternative way to study cognitive complexity is to associate it with the number of
rounds of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies subjects are able to perform.
Our games di¤er in the number of rounds of iterated elimination of dominated strategies
necessary to reach the equilibrium outcome. We nd that subjectsequilibrium behaviour
across games was not a¤ected by this measure of complexity.
Finally, calculating best responses may be more di¢ cult for subjects when payo¤s are
represented by several digit numbers or when there are conversion rate between experimental
currency and real monetary payo¤s from the experiment. Thus, we use one-digit numbers and
a one-to-one relationship between experimental currency and payo¤s, while maintaining the
strategic complexity of the games and we nd higher percentages of best response behaviour
than in previous similar research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and proce-
dures. Section 3 contains the results and the main descriptive statistics. Section 4 explains
a follow-up experiment to check the robustness of our results to sequential play. Section 5
concludes. Instructions are available through request to the author.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 Experimental Design
Subjects were presented with a series of ten 3x3 Constant Sum Normal Form Games with
Unique Equilibrium in Pure Strategies. For each of the ten games, they were asked to perform
two tasks: they had to choose an action (between U, Mor D) and they had to report
how many of the players on the other subjectsrole they thought would play each of the three
actions available (L, Cand R).
We constructed a 2x2 design according to two criteria. The rst criterion was the order
in which subjects had to perform the two tasks. In treatments BABAF and BABAU subjects
were asked for each game, rst to state their Beliefs (B) and then to chose an Action (A),
after which, they moved on to the next game. In treatments ABF and ABU subjects rst
chose an action in the ten games, without knowing what the second task would consist of,
and then, after answers for all actions were collected, they were presented again with the ten
same games and asked to state their beliefs about opponentsplay. Comparing the BABA
and AB treatments allows us to study whether eliciting beliefs before playing the games
inuences behaviour.
The second criterion was whether an equal split of payo¤s was feasible in each of the
games. As the games were constant sum, the sum of payo¤s both subjects could earn was
always the same and equal to £ 12, no matter the strategies chosen by both players. In
treatments BABAF and ABF an equal split of payo¤s was feasible in one of the cells of
all the games subjects played. In treatments BABAU and ABU payo¤s in all games were
substituted in this cell by an unequal split, such that one subject would get a payo¤ of £ 7
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and the other a payo¤ of £ 5. For example, in Game 4R below, payo¤s when Row subjects
chose M and Columns subjects chose L were £ 6 for both subjects in the F treatments, while
they were £ 5 for Row subjects and £ 7 for Column subjects in the U treatments. The location
of the cell and the changes in payo¤s from the F to the U treatments were such that it never
a¤ected neither the predictions of the six behavioural models we study nor the degrees of strict
dominance solvability, such that it changed whether the Row or Column player earned more
than the equal split of payo¤s in the U treatments and such that subjects would get higher
payo¤s in this cell in some games (lower in others) than in the Nash equilibrium outcome.
The cell in which the equal split was feasible never coincided with the Nash equilibrium
outcome. Comparing the F and U treatments allows us to study whether the feasibility of
an exact equal split inuenced behaviour, which may be an indication of whether subjects
distributional concerns have an e¤ect in constant sum games.
Game 4R (U Treatment) Game 4R (F Treatment)
Column Column
L C R L C R
U 4,8 2,10 1,11 U 4,8 2,10 1,11
Row M 5,7 11,1 4,8 Row M 6,6 11,1 4,8
D 7,5 8,4 10,2 D 7,5 8,4 10,2
2.2 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was carried out with pen and paper in the ELSE laboratory during April
2004. Subjects were recruited by E-mail using the ELSE database, which consists of UCL
undergraduate and graduate students. As we are interested in behaviour played without
previous experience, we only recruited subjects without previous experience in game experi-
ments and whose eld of study indicated that they would not be familiar with Game Theory
nor Economics.
We performed four sessions (one per treatment) with twenty subjects. In each session,
ten subjects were randomly assigned Rowroles in all ten games, while the other ten sub-
jects were assigned Columnroles. However, no subject was aware of their role (nor other
subjectsroles) as games were presented to all players from the point of view of row players.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned seats and were asked to read some prelim-
inary instructions, which described a strategic decision situation and the 3x3 payo¤ matrix
associated with its normal form representation. Then subjects were required to pass an Un-
derstanding Test where they had to demonstrate that they knew how to map playersactions
in a game to outcomes, and outcomes to playerspayo¤s. Subjects were told that those who
failed the test would act as assistantsin the experiment. No subject failed the test.
The experiment consisted of ten games which were presented in random and di¤erent order
to each subject to control for (possible) non-feedback learning.7 In the BABA treatments
7Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (04) conclude that there was no learning across games in their very similar
setting.
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subjects rst read the instructions on stating rst order beliefs and choosing actions and how
they would be rewarded for these two tasks. Then subjects stated beliefs and chose actions
for all ten games with no feedback. Subjects stated beliefs by writing down how many of
the 10 subjects in the opponentsrole they believed would chose each of their three possible
actions in each game. In the AB treatments, subjects rst read the instructions about how
to choose their actions, and then played those games (Part I). After Part I, answer sheets
were collected and subjects read the instructions on beliefs. Next, they stated their beliefs
for all 10 games (Part II). This procedure guaranteed that in the AB treatments, actions
were chosen before, beliefs had been mentioned. Finally, all answer sheets were collected.
For each game subjects were randomly and anonymously paired with a di¤erent partic-
ipant. Subjects never learned who their matched participant in each game was, neither the
action which was taken by their matched participant or any other participant in any game.
Subjects were paid according to their answers in both tasks as follows. At the end of each
session, a number from 1 to 10 was selected from a bingo urn. This number indicated for which
of the 10 games all subjects would be paid for both tasks.8 Actions were rewarded according
to the strategies chose by each pair of matched participants in the particular game selected.
Stated beliefs were paid according to a Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) which rewarded ac-
curacy prediction.9 The QSR was designed such that subjects could earn comparatively less
money with their belief statements than with their action choices (Maximum of £ 2 and £ 11
respectively). Had payo¤s for both tasks been similar, risk averse subjects may be induced to
take actions that were not best responses to their stated beliefs in the aim to average payo¤s.
Subjects were paid the sum of a £ 5 xed fee, plus their earnings for choosing actions and
stating beliefs. Average payments were £ 12.78 (around $20 at the time). Each session lasted
one hour and subjects were allocated forty minutes to perform both tasks.
2.3 The Games
We classify our games according to whether they are dominance solvable or not. Eight of our
games are dominance solvable. Games 1R and 1C are dominance solvable with one round of
dominance to reach the equilibrium for one of the players (Row in 1R, Column in 1C) and two
rounds of dominance for the other player. Games 2R and 2C are solvable with two rounds
for one player (Row in 2R, Column in 2C) and three rounds for the other. Games 3R and 3C
8We paid subjects for one random game instead of for an aggregated measure of their answers in all 10
games to be able to maintain the one to one relationship between outcomes and payo¤s. Avoiding conversion
rates may help clarifying incentives, which may be particularly important in experiments in which beliefs on
other subjectsbehavior are elicited.
9When subjects are asked to predict the frequencies of play of a nite population of subjects, QSRs are not
necessarily incentive compatible as subjectsaverage expectation of play of each action might not necessarily
be equal to one of the possible empirical distributions over the nite set of opponentsactions. In any case,
expected payo¤ maximizers can do no better by stating di¤erent beliefs than their true beliefs and given our
results we think the problem is minor. For a discussion on QSRs see O¤erman, Sonnemans and Schram (1996),
O¤erman and Sonnemans (2001) and Selten (1998). The particular QSR we used, along with an intuitive
explanation for subjects highlighting that understanding the maths of the rule was not essential, can be found
in the Instructions.
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are solvable with three rounds of dominance for one player (Row in 3R, Column in 3C) and
two for the other, although the rst deletion of strictly dominated strategies is simultaneous
for both players. Games 4R and 4C are solvable with four rounds for one player (Row in 4R,
Column in 4C) and three rounds for the other. Finally, Games NR and NC are not dominance
solvable and have no strictly dominated actions.10 In the U treatments, Games 1R, 2R, 2C
and 3R had additional weakly dominated strategies, apart from the strictly dominated ones.
Game 1R Game 1C
L C R L C R
U 3,9 4,8 5,7 U 10,2 2,10 1,11
M 5,7 7,5 7,5 M 9,3 8,4 2,10
D 9,3 9,3 8,4 D 7,5 4,8 3,9
Game 2R Game 2C
L C R L C R
U 5,7 5,7 4,8 U 11,1 4,8 7,5
M 2,10 11,1 3,9 M 4,8 4,8 1,11
D 1,11 10,2 3,9 D 7,5 5,7 7,5
Game 3R Game 3C
L C R L C R
U 5,7 4,8 5,7 U 9,3 1,11 8,4
M 3,9 1,11 4,8 M 10,2 10,2 9,3
D 3,9 3,9 11,1 D 8,4 11,1 7,5
Game 4R Game 4C
L C R L C R
U 4,8 2,10 1,11 U 7,5 8,4 9,3
M 5,7 11,1 4,8 M 5,7 11,1 9,3
D 7,5 8,4 10,2 D 3,9 1,11 10,2
Game NR Game NC
L C R L C R
U 8,4 5,7 1,11 U 1,11 7,5 3,9
M 5,7 5,7 5,7 M 4,8 4,8 4,8
D 2,10 5,7 7,5 D 8,4 2,10 3,9
We selected 3x3 games in which the prediction of how subjects would play would not be
trivial. Accordingly, we designed the games such that we were able to discriminate Nash
Equilibrium choices11 from the choices predicted by ve other models that have proven to
be at least partially successful in previous studies on depths of reasoning.12 These models
10Out of the six possible types of 3x3 constant sum games with unique pure strategy equilibria, we covered
all but one possible case according to their degree of strict dominance solvability. The remaining case has a
dominated strategy for one of the subjects and it is not dominance solvable.
11Simply referred as Equilibrium, from here onwards.
12Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Broseta, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2001),
Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2004), Weizsäcker (2003) and Goeree and Holt (2004).
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are named L1, L2, L3, D1 and Maximax. L1 predicts that each subjectsaction is a best
response against the belief that the opponent is playing each action with equal probability.
L2 predicts a best response against the belief that the opponent is playing according to L1
and L3 predicts a best response to the believing the opponent plays according to L2. D1
predicts a best response against a uniform belief over the opponentsundominated actions.
Maximax (MM) predicts the action that is part of the action prole leading to the players
highest possible payo¤ in the game.13
Table I below shows the number of rounds of dominance solvability for each game and
subject role, the prediction of each of the six models we compare and the action prole which
was changed by the equal split in the F treatments.
Table I: Games by Rounds of Dominance and ModelsPredictions
Game Dominance Nash L1 L2 L3 D1 MM Equal Mm mM Ef
1R (1,2) D-R D-L D-R D-R D-R D-L M-L D-C M-R D-R
1C (2,1) D-R M-R D-R D-R D-R U-R D-L M-R D-C U-R
2R (2,3) U-R M-L U-L U-R U-L M-L U-L U-L M-R D-C
2C (3,2) D-C U-C D-C D-C U-C U-R D-L D-L U-C U-L
3R (3,2) U-C D-C U-C U-C U-C D-C U-L D-C U-L D-R
3C (2,3) M-R M-C D-R M-R M-R D-C D-R M-C D-L M-R
4R (4,3) D-L D-R D-L D-L D-L M-R M-L M-L M-R U-R
4C (3,4) U-L M-L U-L U-L M-L M-C M-L M-L M-L M-C
NR No M-C M-R D-R D-L M-R U-R D-R M-L M-R U-L
NC No M-R D-R M-C U-C D-R D-L U-C U-R D-R D-L
3 Experimental Results
3.1 Main Descriptive Statistics
Table II below reports, for each of the ten games, high percentages of equilibrium actions
taken (80%), of frequencies assigned to opponentschoosing equilibrium actions (58%) and
of best responses to stated beliefs (73%). Frequencies were similar across games and the
number of rounds of iterated dominance does not seem to a¤ect percentages in a clear cut
manner. However, in the two non dominance solvable games (NR and NC) percentages were
lower than in the other games. This is particularly true for the percentage of best responses.
Below we study results in more detail.
13Stahl and Wilson (1994) use a more sophisticated version of these models. According to their denition,
L2 is a best response to a belief distribution which assigns positive weights to a portion of the population
choosing actions randomly (L0) and the remaining portion to subjects best responding to uniform beliefs (L1).
The reason to dene the zero-level of rationality as an equal probability to play each possible strategy, and
thus dene degrees of rationality from there on, remains open.
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Table II: Percentages of Equilibrium Actions, Beliefs and Best Responses
Game Equilibrium Actions Equilibrium Beliefs Best Response
1R 76.25 58.5 80
1C 75 59.375 75
2R 82.5 55.875 83.75
2C 81.25 51.125 71.25
3R 82.5 64.75 77.5
3C 86.25 63.125 77.5
4R 87.5 59.625 82.5
4C 78.75 59 80
NR 72.5 52.875 47.5
NC 73.75 51.5 55
Average 79.625 57.575 73
3.2 Treatment E¤ects
In this section we study whether di¤erent treatments had an e¤ect on subjectsbehaviour.
In particular we study: 1) the e¤ect of eliciting beliefs immediately before actions were taken
and 2) the e¤ect of equal payo¤ splits being feasible.
We start with the rst question and rst look at actions chosen. We use Fishers Exact
Probability Test (FEPT) for count data14 which tests if di¤erences in observed proportions
of actions chosen between two treatments might be expected by chance. The null hypothesis
(two-tailed) is that there is no di¤erence in the probability of playing each strategy generating
the observed proportion of play of each strategy in each treatment. We used the free software
R (2003) to perform FEPTs and all other tests in this paper.
We conduct FEPTs separately for each game. We rst compare subjects aggregate
actions for each player role (Row or Column) in each of the ten games between the BABA
and the AB treatments (without aggregating the F and U treatments). Out of the 40 possible
comparisons, we can never reject the null hypothesis that the underlying probability is the
same at the 5% signicance level. We then perform a stronger test by pooling the data for
the F and U treatments. Again, there is no p-value smaller than 5% so we cannot reject the
hypothesis that there is no e¤ect of the order of tasks performed in the aggregate actions.
Our next step is to test if the order of tasks a¤ected subjects belief statements. We
collapse each agents belief statements into one of four categories: for each of the three
actions all the stated beliefs that assigned more than half of the frequency to an action
were classied in the same category (thus creating three categories), and the last category
comprises all the beliefs that do not assign more than half of the frequency to any of the three
actions opponents can take. This allows us to create a contingency table and use FEPTs to
test for di¤erences in belief statements between BABA and AB treatments.15
14Developed by Fisher (1935), Irwin (1935) and Yates (1934).
15This procedure was previously used by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2004).
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When comparing subjectsaggregate belief statements for each player role in each of the
ten games between treatments BABA and AB treatments (without aggregating the F and U
treatments) we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no di¤erence in all comparisons. When
we perform a stronger test by pooling the F and U treatments we can only reject it once
(p-value equal to 0.003 for Row subjects in Game NC), which may be expected by chance.
Thus, we conclude the following:
Result 1 The order in which subjects performed both tasks did not a¤ect behaviour.
We now study whether the feasibility of equal payo¤ splits had an e¤ect on behaviour.
We again use FEPTs under the null hypothesis that there was no di¤erence across treatments
in the probability of playing (or stating) the observed proportions of play (or beliefs stated)
of each action.
When comparing aggregate actions between the F and the U treatments for each player
role (without aggregating the BABA and the AB treatments), no p-value is smaller than 5%.
When we pool the BABA and AB treatments and we compare the F and U treatments across
player roles, only one out of the 20 possible p-values is smaller than 5% (p-value equal to
0.006 for Row subjects in Game 4C), which may be expected by chance. We also performed
Mann-Whitney tests under the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of games
in which subjects chose the strategy containing the equal split was not di¤erent between the
F and U treatments at the 5% signicance level. Both when we aggregate the BABA and
the AB treatments and when we do not, we could never reject the null hypothesis. Thus,
we conclude that actions chosen were not a¤ected by whether equal splits were available or
not.16
Moving on to beliefs, we used the previous classication of beliefs and we performed
FEPTs comparing same games under the F and U treatments. We obtain no p-value smaller
than 0.05 for the 40 comparisons when we do not aggregate treatments with respect to the
order of tasks. When we do aggregate them, only one of the 20 possible p-values is smaller
than 0.05 (p-value of 0.0189 for Column subjects in Game NC), which indicates that there is
no e¤ect of the feasibility of equal splits. We also performed Mann-Whitney tests comparing
the distribution of average frequencies assigned to the strategy which contained the equal
payo¤ splits between the F and U treatments, again for each game and player role. We could
never reject the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of frequencies assigned
to the strategy containing the equal split was not di¤erent at the 5% signicance level, both
when aggregating the BABA and AB treatments and when not. Thus, we conclude:
Result 2: Behaviour was not a¤ected by the feasibility of equal splits.
Small payo¤ di¤erences between the equal and unequal split might explain Result 2.
It would be worthwhile to study robustness to higher payo¤ di¤erences. An alternative
16Same results were obtained for the null hypothesis that the feasibility of equal splits did not a¤ect the
median of the distribution of the number of games in which subjects played the equilibrium action neither of
the number of games in which they best responded to their stated beliefs.
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explanation is that the equal split was feasible (or not) in all the games subjects played.
As subjects were only paid for one of the games, our experiment resembles the strategy
method, in which a weakening of the equal split e¤ecthas previously been observed (Güth
et al. (2001)). Results in section 4 conrm that equal splits did not a¤ect behaviour even in
sequential games.
We use results 1 and 2 to pool the data across treatments and analyze actions and beliefs
in the following sections.
3.3 Actions
Table III shows the percentage of compliance with equilibrium predictions for each game by
subject role.
Table III: Percentages of Equilibrium Actions
Game Row Column All Subjects No Rounds Iterated Dominance
1R 80 72.5 76.25 (1,2)
1C 60 90 75 (2,1)
2R 95 70 82.5 (2,3)
2C 75 87.5 81.25 (3,2)
3R 92.5 72.5 82.5 (3,2)
3C 87.5 87.5 86.25 (2,3)
4R 87.5 87.5 87.5 (4,3)
4C 67.5 90 78.75 (3,4)
NR 92.5 52.5 72.5 No
NC 72.5 75 73.75 No
Average 81 78.5 79.625
On average, subjects played equilibrium actions in 79.625% of the cases. There is no clear
pattern between the number of rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies required
to reach the equilibrium and the percentage of equilibrium actions played. For example,
games 1R and 1C show a lower percentage of equilibrium actions than games 3C or 4R. We
also noticed that the lowest percentage of equilibrium play occurred in the non-dominance
solvable games (NR and NC). We created contingency tables with the number of subjects
who played equilibrium actions in each of the games (aggregating both subject roles)17 and
performed McNemars tests18 under the null hypothesis that there was no statistically signif-
icant di¤erence in the proportion of compliance with equilibrium between each pair of games.
We do not nd statistically signicant di¤erences between games at the 5% level. When we
17This creates seven categories: subjects who reach the equilibrium strategy in 1 round of iterated deletion,
2 rounds, 2 rounds with simultaneous deletion in the rst round, 3 rounds, 3 rounds with simultaneous deletion
in the rst round, 4 rounds and non dominance solvable. Notice that not all these categories have the same
number of subjects, but that the Chi-square test allows us to do this comparison.
18 In the following, we use McNemars to exploit the statistical power derived from having the same subjects
playing across di¤erent games. When this is not fullled, we use Chi-square tests.
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do not group subject roles we perform Chi-Square test under the same null and nd some
signicant di¤erences, for example between Row subjects in game 2R and NC, but no clear
pattern emerges. Thus the degree of iterated dominance needed to reach equilibrium is not
a straightforward measure of the proportion of equilibrium play. This result may indicate
that either subjects were not reasoning in terms of iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies or that the number of rounds of iterated deletion was not high enough to make
a di¤erence. Crawford (2004) argues that in their initial responses to games subjects sel-
dom play dominated strategies but usually respect at most three of four rounds of iterated
dominance. Our results do not contradict this claim.
Overall we conclude:
Result 3: Subjects played equilibrium strategies in 80% of the cases. The number
of rounds of necessary deletion of strictly dominated strategies to reach the Nash
equilibrium was not a clear indicator of the percentage with which the equilibrium
strategies were played.
We now compare how well the equilibrium model predicted actions taken in comparison
to other models. Table IV shows the percentage of actions taken that were predicted by the
standard equilibrium model, together with the percentage rates predicted by each the other
ve models described in section 2.3.
Table IV: Percentage of Actions Matched by ModelsPredictions
Game Nash L1 L2 L3 D1 Maximax
1R 76.25 51.25 76.25 76.25 76.25 51.25
1C 75 62.5 75 75 75 47.5
2R 82.5 17.5 62.5 82.5 62.5 17.5
2C 81.25 56.25 81.25 81.25 56.25 16.25
3R 82.5 38.75 82.5 82.5 82.5 38.75
3C 86.25 48.75 51.25 86.25 86.25 13.75
4R 87.5 50 87.5 87.5 87.5 12.5
4C 78.75 61.25 78.75 78.75 61.25 17.5
NR 72.5 66.25 22.5 62.5 66.25 21.25
NC 73.75 50 46.25 11.25 50 15
Average 79.625 50.25 66.37 66.75 70.37 25.125
Equilibrium outperforms the predictions of the other models in all games.19 Although the
games were intentionally constructed to highlight di¤erences between modelspredictions, it
is noticeable L1 and L2, which were the most successful models in Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker
(2004), perform clearly worse across all games than Nash.20 Of the models analyzed, the one
19Equilibrium also outperforms each of the other models in all games when subject roles are not pooled.
20Notice that L2 predicts the same outcome as Equilibrium in six games, while L1 does not predict the
same outcome as Equilibrium in any game. Thus, we should not infer that L2 captures behavior better than
L1. L3 coincides with Equilibrium in all but Games NR and NC, where it performs signicantly worse.
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that comes second in predicting the aggregate of actions is D1, with a percentage of 70.375%.
D1 predicts the same action as Nash for ve of the ten games. In the ve games were the
predictions of both models are di¤erent, Nash outperforms D1 in all games, with an overall
success rate of 77.75% against 49.35%.
We now look at individual behaviour. First, the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the percentage of subjects who played at least a certain number of games according to each
modelspredictions shows that while 20% of the subjects played according to the Equilibrium
prediction in all ten games, at most only 1.25% of the subjects played in all ten games
according to any of the other models here studied. 70% of the subjects chose at least 8
actions according to the Equilibrium model.
Second, Table V classies subjects according to the model whose predicted action subjects
chose in the highest number of games. First, there were 56 out of the 80 subjects that could
be clearly classied to a model according to this criterion. i.e., who responded the highest
number of times according to only one model. Of these, 69.6% of subjects were classied as
Equilibrium. There are 24 subjects who could not be classied in this manner, as there
were ties between various models. Columns Tiesand Overalladds up to more than 100%
because we include in each model category all subjects who play according to such model
the highest number of times, no mateer the ties. In any case, 87.5% of the subjects who tied
between two or more models, chose the highest number of actions according to Equilibrium
and some other model, while only 50% did it according to D1and some other model. In
the column Overall, we add up both the clear cases and the ties to conclude that 75%
of the 80 subjects can be classied as Equilibrium, while only 26.25% of subjects can be
classied as D1. Other models show lower percentages. Finally, we show in parenthesis the
average number of games in which subjects classied in each model category chose actions
according to each model. Notice that this average measures the intensity with which subjects
were classied with respect to each model and thus, it shows that subjects classied in each
category were quite consistent with the model in which they were classied.21
Table V: Classication in models to which subjects respond most times
Model Clear Cases Ties Overall
Nash 69.6 (9.05) 87.5 (7.86) 75 (8.63)
L1 5.36 (8.66) 8.33 (6.5) 6.25 (8.2)
L2 5.36 (8.66) 41.66 (7.2) 16.25 (7.53)
L3 1.78 (9) 25 (7.33) 8.75 (7.33)
D1 16.07 (8.66) 50 (8.08) 26.25 (8.34)
Maximax 1.78 (8) 8.33 (6.5) 3.75 (7)
Thus, we conclude:
21Had subjects chosen randomly they would have answered on average in 3.3 games according to each model
and, given the structure of the games, the average intensity of subjects classied in each category would have
been 5.1.
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Result 4: Equilibrium captures actions played by subjects better than the alterna-
tive models, both at the individual and aggregate levels.
Although we cannot discard that there may be other models that capture behaviour
better than those studied here and in particular models allowing for errors in subjectsactions
depending on the size of the payo¤s, it is clear that Nash is a good predictor of actions taken
for the class of games here studied.
3.4 Stated Beliefs
Subjects expected on average that their opponents would play the Nash equilibrium action
with the highest frequency in each game (58%). Frequencies assigned to equilibrium play
were disperse but again Wilcoxon tests at the 5% signicance level conrmed there was not a
clear pattern between the number of rounds of iterated dominance and the frequency assigned
to equilibrium actions by opponents.
Table VI shows the average frequency of beliefs assigned to the predictions of the six
models we compare for each of the games. Although in all but game 1R the highest frequency
was assigned to the prediction of the Nash model the predictive value of the six models was
more similar for beliefs than for actions. Notice also that the order in which each of the
models is successful is practically the same with beliefs stated as it happened with actions
(although with beliefs L3 outperforms L2).
Table VI: Average Frequency of Stated Beliefs on ModelsPredictions
Game Nash L1 L2 L3 D1 Maximax
1R 58.5 61.25 58.5 58.5 58.5 61.25
1C 59.38 51.38 59.38 59.38 59.38 42.38
2R 55.88 33 56.13 55.88 56.13 33
2C 51.13 49.75 51.13 51.13 49.75 33.63
3R 64.75 44.38 64.75 64.75 64.75 44.38
3C 63.13 49.75 36.75 63.13 63.13 23.38
4R 59.63 49.63 59.63 59.63 59.63 30.63
4C 59 54.25 59 59 54.25 31.25
NR 52.88 49 29.63 19.13 49 28
NC 51.5 39.88 40.75 22.13 39.88 26.38
Average 57.58 48.23 51.56 51.26 55.44 35.73
We thus conclude:
Result 5: While Equilibrium still captures belief statements better than the other
models studied here, di¤erences with other models are smaller than with actions.
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Subjects believed equilibrium actions would be played with lower frequency that they
were actually played. As observed in previous experiments22 stated beliefs were conservative,
in the sense that the empirical distribution of beliefs was atter than the distribution of
actions played. The percentage of belief statements that assigned frequency one to all ten
opponents playing one particular strategy was 11.125%. However, tendency to conservatism
does not mean that subjects assigned equal frequency to their opponents playing each of their
three available actions. The percentage of uniform belief statements23 is only 5.875%, much
lower, in fact, than the percentage of belief statements that assigned zero frequency to at
least one of the opponentsactions (42%). Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2004) claim that
the higher percentage of zero-belief statements than uniform beliefs is a reason to discard
that conservatism may be caused by risk aversion. They argue that since QSRs punish large
mispredictions, risk averse subjects would avoid losses by making roughly uniform belief
statements, which subjects did not make in most of the cases. However, notice that even a
highly risk averse subject would state zero beliefs to two of his opponentsactions if he was
su¢ ciently certain about the actions that all opponents would take in a particular game.
The average mean square error deviation of stated beliefs was 23.17 out of a feasible
range of [0,200]. We assess the accuracy of belief statements in the aggregate by looking
at whether subjects predicted the average structure of frequencies correctly. We dene
correct structure of beliefs as subjects assigning highest frequency to the actions which were
played with highest frequency and assigning lowest average frequency to the actions which
were played with lowest frequency. Table VII compares, for each game and subject role,
the average frequency with which each of the three actions was played by subjects, with the
average percentage of stated frequency assigned by the opponents to those same actions. It
is noticeable that for all but three comparisons, aggregate average beliefs get the structure
of frequenciesplayed correctly.24
22Huck and Weizsäcker (2001), Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2004)
23Dened as statements that assigned frequency of 3 to two actions and 4 to the other one.
24The di¤erence between frequencies assigned in those three games was, however, very small. These games
are indicated in Table VII with a star (*). The double star (**) in game 4C indicates that the order of beliefs
with which the second and the third actions were played was inverted.
15
Table VII: Structure of Aggregate Beliefs and Actions
Game Row Actions Column Beliefs
U action M action D action U belief M belief D belief
1R 0 20 80 3 15.25 81.75
1C 5 35 60 16 34 50
2R 95 5 0 66.5 20.25 13.25
2C 25 0 75 42.25 12.75 45
3R 92.5 2.5 5 66.25 8.25 25.5
3C 0 85 15 6.25 73.25 20.5
4R 0 12.5 87.5 5.5 28.25 66.25
4C 67.5 32.5 0 50.25 40.75 9
NR 2.5 92.5 5 18.25 60.25 21.5
NC 2.5 72.5 25 16.25 53.5 30.25
Column Actions Row Beliefs
1R 22.5 5 72.5 40.75 24 35.25*
1C 2.5 7.5 90 11.5 19.75 68.75
2R 30 0 70 45.75 9 45.25*
2C 5 87.5 7.5 11.75 57.25 31
3R 15 72.5 12.5 27.25 63.25 9.5
3C 0 12.5 87.5 20.25 26.25 53
4R 87.5 0 12.5 53 14 33
4C 90 2.5 7.5 67.75 21.75 10.5**
NR 7.5 52.5 40 16.75 45.5 37.75
NC 5 20 75 22.5 28 49.5
However, when looking at each subject individually, the patterns of aggregate behaviour
do not translate well into individual behaviour across games. While 75% of the subjects
assigned highest frequency in six or more games to the action that was played with highest
frequency, only 8.75% of the subjects did, at the same time, assigned the lowest frequency
to the action that was played with lowest frequency in those six or more games, and thus,
answered with the same structure of frequencies of beliefs as their opponents played. 28.25%
of belief statements assigned the same frequency to the two actions that were not believed to
be played with highest frequency.
We conclude:
Result 6: Subjects were good at predicting the actions that were played with highest
frequency by their opponents, although stated beliefs tended to be conservative.
3.5 Best Response of Actions to Stated Beliefs
We nally check for consistency by analyzing whether actions chosen were best replies to
stated beliefs. We dene best replying behaviour as choosing the action that gives the high-
est expected payo¤ given the distribution of beliefs stated. According to this denition, best
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replying implies that subjectsutilities only depend on own monetary payo¤s and that sub-
jects are risk neutral. Results below show that a majority of subjects satised this denition.
First, as it would be obvious from previous results, subjects clearly best responded to
their stated beliefs more often than they would have had they chosen their actions randomly.
Kolmogorov-Smirno¤ Goodness of Fit Tests comparing the empirical CDFs to the CDF
implied by random behaviour gives p-values of virtually zero. Table VIII shows the percentage
of best responses by game and player role. Overall, subjects best responded to their stated
beliefs in 73.375% of the cases, higher than the 50% observed in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker
(2004).
Thus, we conclude:
Result 7: Subjects best responded to their stated beliefs a high number of times
(73% of the cases).
By comparing the percentage of best responses across games for all subjects using Mc-
Nemars test (5% signicance level), we again observe the familiar pattern that the number
of rounds of iterated dominance does a¤ect in a clear way the percentage of best replies.
However the percentage of best responses was signicantly lower in the two non-dominance
solvable games (NR and NC) than in some of the other games. Notice that in these two
games at least one of the subjects could obtain the same payo¤ no matter the action chosen
by its rival which, as we discuss below may be important. At an individual level, 70% of
subjects best responded to their stated beliefs in seven or more games.
Table VIII: Percentage of best Responses to Stated Beliefs
Game Row Subjects Column Subjects All Subjects
1R 80 77.5 78.75
1C 60 90 75
2R 90 88.5 83.75
2C 80 80 80
3R 80 72.5 76.25
3C 77.5 80 78.75
4R 82.5 85 83.75
4C 57.5 87.5 72.5
NR 60 40 50
NC 60 50 55
Average 72.75 74 73.375
Although the proportion of non-best response behaviour is not insignicant, it is small.
We look into the nature of non-best response behaviour by calculating how much subjects
lost for not best responding to their stated beliefs. We use the monetary losses subjects
made when non-best responding to their stated beliefs as a proxy for how important it was
for them.
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We proceed by calculating, for each subject, the sum of its expected loss when not best
responding to their stated beliefs averaged over the ten games each subject played. We nd
that Row subjects lost on average £ 0.3037 per game and Column subjects lost on average
£ 0.3205 per game. Given that subjects were only paid for their actions in one game, these
were the average losses per subject. Next, we calculate the average maximum feasible loss
had subjects have played, in all games, the action that gave them the lowest possible expected
payo¤, given their stated beliefs. On average, Row subjects could have lost £ 3.05 per game
while Column Subjects could have lost £ 2.69 per game. Finally, we divide both numbers to
calculate for each subject in each game, the percentage of the maximum loss they incurred
by not best responding. Averaging over all games for each subject role we obtain that Row
subjects lost on average 10.97% of the maximum losses they could have made, while Column
subjects lost 15.96% of the maximum possible losses. To put things in perspective, Row
subjects would have lost 40.21% of the maximum possible losses they could have made had
they chosen the action that neither was a best response nor the worst response to their stated
beliefs in all ten games. Column subjects would have lost 55.24% of the maximum possible
losses had their chosen this action in all 10 games.25 Therefore, we conclude:
Result 8: As subjects best responded in most of the games, they did not lose much
with respect to the maximum losses they could have made.
Not best responding is not the only kind of mistake subjects could have made. Subjects
could also err in the accuracy of their predictions of opponentsplay. Although the mone-
tary loss derived from this mistake would be minimal, as payments for stated beliefs have an
upper bound of £ 2, a bad prediction of how opponents play, even if it was a best response to
stated beliefs, could result in taking a non-optimal action, given the frequencies with which
opponents really played. We address whether both types of mistakes (bad predictions and
non-best response behaviour) are related, by calculating the correlation between each sub-
jectsaverage mean square error of his predictions and the average percentage of maximum
loss for not best responding each subject makes. We nd that there is positive signicant
correlation between both series (Pearsons coe¢ cient of 0.559 with a p-value of 6.8e-08).26
This high correlation means that subjects who chose equilibrium actions, also expected a
high proportion of their opponents to choose equilibrium actions, and that this prediction
was right. This suggests that subjects may have believed that their opponents would choose
their actions in a similar way as they did. We thus conclude:
Result 9: Subjects who are better at predicting the frequencies of play of their
opponents are also the ones who lost, on average, less for not best responding.
25An alternative way of calculating the hypothetical loses is to use the real frequencies of play by the
opponents instead of the stated beliefs. Given that the percentage of best response to stated beliefs is similar
to the percentage of best response to realplay by the opponents, overall percentages only slightly.
26We also calculated the correlation between each subjects number of best responses with the mean square
error of predictions and Pearsons coe¢ cient was, as expected, negative and signicant (Pearsons coe¢ cient:
0.55, p-value 8.6e-08).
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4 Exploring Social Preferences Further: Sequential Games
We here show a replication of our experiment with sequential games which share the same
payo¤ matrix as the previous ones and compare results. As such, we here check whether
subjects play according to the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Prediction. Previous
experiments have yielded large and systematic deviations from subgame perfect predictions.27
Experimental procedures were the natural extension of the previous experiment to sequential
games, although due to having a more complicated strategy space, we did not elicit beliefs.
Treatments di¤ered in whether it was the rst or second mover who share the payo¤s of
the Row or Column player of the previous experiment and again whether equal splits were
feasible. Instead, subjects were asked to explain how they took their decisions once they have
nished chosen them.28
A possible reason for di¤erences in the outcomes of simultaneous and sequential games
with the same payo¤matrix may be that subjects may put greater weight on other regarding
preferences in sequential games. This would seem particularly true for models of other re-
garding preferences that incorporate intentionality, as the sequentiallity of the games makes
clear that a second players decision is contingent on the rst players choice and therefore,
the way a second mover interprets the intentions of the strategy chosen by a rst mover can
clearly inuence the outcome of the play. Anticipating this, a rst mover may carefully select
his own strategy in order to make, for example, the second mover interpret his intentions in
a way that may induce him to reward supposedly kind behaviour by the rst mover.
There is at least one type of sequential constant sum games in which there is evidence
that other regarding preferences may a¤ect laboratory play: dictator games.29 In them,
a single subject has to allocate a xed amount between him and another subject, with no
strategic decision being taken by the receiver. When dictator games have been played in
the laboratory strictly controlling for anonymity (both between subjects and with respect to
the experimenter) a signicant proportion of subjects does not concord with the equilibrium
prediction consisting in allocating the minimum possible amount to the other player.30 In
our experiment, the situation faced by second movers is similar to the allocatorssituation
in dictator games. In fact, we could dene second movers strategic situation as mini-
dictator games, since second movers do not have a continuous choice but they can only
choose between three actions. There is a di¤erence however between mini-dictator games and
our games: when second movers in our games have to choose their action, they are limited by
the action taken by rst movers and therefore, intentionality and willingness to reward kind
behaviour may a¤ect their choices. In dictator games, there is no possible response to the
allocators strategy and thus, non equilibrium outcomes may be explained by distributional
preferences by themselves, with no need of reciprocal or intentionally driven other regarding
preferences. In Falk and Kosfeld (2005) second movers decide an allocation of a constant
27See Crawford (2002), Johnson et al. (2002) and Binmore et al. (2002).
28 Instructions are available by request to the author.
29See Ho¤man, McCabe and Smith (1999) and Roth (1995).
30See Bolton and Zwick (1995) and Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998).
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quantity between then and a rst mover, after observing whether the rst mover decides to
restrict or not the interval in which the second mover can decide. Thus, second movers face
a dictator game situation once rst movers have restricted them or not. They observe that
when rst movers restrict second movers, they allocate less to rst movers. Thus, although
the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is not fullled, the intentions31 signalled by
whether rst movers restrict or not makes a di¤erence on second movers. Fey, McKelvey
and Palfrey (1996) carried out sequential constant sum centipede games in which, at the rst
round, payo¤s are divided evenly and, as the players pass, the division gets more and more
lopsided. They observe that the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in which the rst
mover takes in the rst round works much better than in centipede games which are not
constant sum.
In terms of both subjects having an option to decide strategically, our games also re-
semble ultimatum games, in which non subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are frequently
observed (Güth et al. (1982)). A key di¤erence with our games is that in ultimatum games,
the second mover has the clear option to punish the rst mover by rejecting his allocation
and leaving both players with no payo¤s. In ultimatum games, such a threat would not be
credible if second movers are only concerned for own payo¤ maximization, but it has been
observed that not only a signicant proportion of second movers exercise such threat, but that
this threat is credible to rst movers and they rarely allocate the minimum possible amount
to second movers. The most frequent explanation for such behavior is that subjects have
other regarding preferences that include intentionality. Ultimatum games are not constant
sum because of the possibility of rejecting o¤ers and leaving both players with no payo¤s.
In the games studied in this chapter, this possibility does not exist and in fact, the maxi-
mum punishmenta second mover can inict on a rst mover is by choosing his own payo¤
maximizing strategy. However, although in constant sum games there is no possibility of
punishment, second moversintentionality driven other regarding preferences could manifest
themselves in second movers rewarding kind behaviour by rst movers and thus, giving up
some units of payo¤s in favour of rst movers who have taken and action interpreted as kind
by second movers.
Table IX presents the main descriptive statistics for each game when grouping all treat-
ments and subject roles. We report, for each of the ten games, the percentage of times the
combination of rst moversand second movers choices reached an Equilibrium outcome,
as well as the percentage of rst movers actions taken according to Equilibrium and the
percentage of second moversactions that were best responses to their matched rst movers
choice. Results are clear. On average, 91.5% of times, the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
was reached. First movers played Equilibrium 93.5% of the times, and second movers best
responded to their matched rst movers choice in 94% of the times. Percentages were high
and non statistically di¤erent across all games.
31Referred as trustby the authors.
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Table IX: Percentage of Equilibrium Played and Best Responses
Game 1st Eq. action 2nd BR Eq. Played (Sequential) Eq. Played (Simultaneous)
1R 92.5 97.5 90 57
1C 92.5 92.5 92.5 54
2R 92.5 87.5 85 66.5
2C 97.5 100 97.5 65.63
3R 95 92.5 90 67
3C 90 92.5 90 74.38
4R 92.5 92.5 92.5 76.57
4C 92.5 95 92.5 60.57
NR 92.5 92.5 90 48.56
NC 97.5 97.5 95 54.375
Average 93.5 94 91.5 62.48
Table IX also shows the comparison of subgame perfect equilibrium played in the sequen-
tial games and the percentage of Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous ones. Chi-square tests
for di¤erences in proportions of equilibrium play between games with the same name conrm
the null hypothesis that the proportions of play were di¤erent between the two experiments in
all games with the same name at the 5% signicance level. This result is important because
if we believe subjects reasoned in game theoretic terms it provides evidence that subjects
may be better able to backward induct in our simple sequential games than to calculate Nash
equilibria in the simultaneous ones. Although second movers had the obvious advantage of
observing rst moverschoices, this result may be a rst indication that behaviour was not
a¤ected by intentional reciprocity.
We conclude:
Result 10: The Equilibrium prediction works well in constant sum games. When the
games are played sequentially, the prediction is even more accurate.
A second test to study if intentional reciprocity a¤ected behaviour is to check if the
feasibility of equal splits a¤ected subjectschoices. Following the same procedures as in the
previous experiment, we rst use Fishers Exact Probability Test (FEPT) for count data. We
conduct FEPT separately for each game. We rst compare subjectsaggregate actions for
each player role (rst or second movers) in each of the ten games between the Fair and Unfair
treatments. Out of the 40 possible comparisons, we can never reject the null hypothesis of
the underlying probability of each subject playing each of the three strategies available being
equal at the 5% signicance level. Table X shows that the total number of actions taken
not according with Equilibrium by rst movers is very similar between the Fair and Unfair
treatments and of these, the number of actions that coincided with the strategy leading to
the equal split (Fair Action) is also very similar between treatments. The same happens
with the number of best responses for second movers. We nally performed Mann-Whitney
tests under the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of the number of games
in which rst movers chose the strategy containing the equal split was not di¤erent between
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the F and U treatments. We could never reject the null hypothesis at the 5% signicance
level.32
Table X: Percentage of Non Equilibrium and fair Actions
First movers Second Movers
Non Eq. Actions Fair Actions % Non BR Fair Actions %
F treatment 32 22 68.75% 31 7 22.58%
U treatment 29 20 68.96% 29 7 24.14%
Thus, we conclude the following:
Result 11: Behaviour was not a¤ected by the feasibility of equal splits.
Small payo¤ di¤erences between the equal and unequal split might explain Result 11.
It would be worthwhile to study robustness to higher payo¤ di¤erences. An alternative
explanation is that the equal split was feasible (or not) in all the games subjects played.
As subjects were only paid for one of the games, our experiment shares characteristics with
experiments carried out under the strategy method, in which a weakening of the equal split
e¤ecthas previously been observed (Güth et al. (2001)). In any case, and admitting these
caveats, our results show that there are circumstances in which subjects do not change their
behaviour whether equal splits are feasible or not when deciding how to share pies of given
sizes, even if one of the subjects moved previous to the other.
We nally classify the comments made by subjects in the post-experiment informal ques-
tionnaire to asses the reasons subjects claimed for their behaviour. After reading subjects
comments we created four categories. Equilibriumcorresponds to subgame perfect equi-
librium reasoning. Maxmin contains comments referring to "secure" or "highest of the
minimum payo¤s" strategies. Fairness corresponds to any argument in which distribu-
tional concerns were mentioned. Finally, Othercorresponds to explanations that we were
not able to classify. Second moversanswers were classied between Best Responses, Fair-
ness, when they provided some argument for distributional concerns and Not Answeras
two subjects did not ll in the voluntary questionnaire. Table XI shows the results.
Table XI: Classication of Questionnaire Answers
First movers Second Movers
Equilibrium 65% Best response 87.5%
Maxmin 22.5%
Fairness 5% Fairness 7.5%
Other 7.5% Not Answer 5%
32Same results were obtained for the null hypothesis that treatment e¤ects did not a¤ect the median of the
distribution of the number of games in which rst movers played the equilibrium strategy and also for the
distribution of second moversbest responses to rst moversactions.
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For rst movers, notice that even if both Equilibrium and Minimaxwould lead to
the same choice and ultimately they both rely in expecting the second mover to choose their
payo¤ maximizing strategy given the rst movers choice and then maximize against it, we
distinguish between both kind of explanations. In total, 87.5% of rst moversexplanations
were classied under one of these reasons. The criterion to separate both reasons was whether
subjectsanswer included a statement referring to the maximum of the minima. For exam-
ple, subject FCC2, a Medicine student in his third year, o¤ered the following explanation:33
I assumed that B participants would choose the column in which they would gain most
money, so I chose the row where I would get the most if they chose their maximum strategy
given my choice.
This was classied as Equilibrium. However subject FRR10, a Russian History student
in her second year claimed:
Compared the three rows. Looked for the lowest number in each row. Then chose which
one of these was highest, which is the amount I would get paid.
This was classied as Maxmin. One of the disagreements occurred over the following
statement by subject FRR9, a second year Geography student:
I know that the B participant will pick the column where they stand to make the most so
I have to pick the row where the minimum I can get is higher than other rows.
This statement seems to contain both reasons, although according to our criteria it was
classied as Maxmin.
In any case, what it is surprising is the small number of statements that made reference
to distributional arguments. There were only two statements by rst movers to distributional
concerns, both of them in Unfair treatments, and thus, in cases where the equal split of
payo¤s was not feasible. These are the following:
Try to choose the most equal amount, and
Try against my better judgment to be fair in my choice of row, so that a fair amount
would also be allocated to B.
With respect to second movers, 87.5% of subjects claimed they chose best responses to
the action taken by rst movers. Here we show a couple of such answers:
For each table, there were only three options. I chose the option that would give me most
money, and,
Based on As selection, I made mine with the highest number reected in the top R
corner.
There were only three second movers who made reference to distributional concerns. Of
these, we here reproduce the explanation given by subject FCR9, a Linguistics student in his
fourth year, who seemed to hint on intentions driven reciprocity guiding his choices:
33Subjects referred to rst movers as A participantsand to second movers as B participants.
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I tried to make a balance between the amount I could get and the money Aperson could
make. I rewarded as well and paid back As decision.
Therefore, we conclude that subjectsclaims are in line with the results of the experiment
and, in particular the percentage of subjects who claimed to have worried for the distribution
of payo¤s was low (only 6.25% of the total of subjects).
5 Discussion
When surveying the experimental evidence in dominance solvable games, Camerer (2003,
Chapter 5), claims that the joint hypothesis of game theoretic reasoning and preferences that
value only ones own payments is easily rejected. He then claims that the interesting question
is whether the rejection is due to the pure self-interest part of the joint hypothesis or to the
game theoretic reasoning part or even to both. We have here designed a simple experiment
in which by using a theoretically useful control for social preferences, we check if subjects
play according to game theoretic predictions, and thus, this may indicate whether subjects
are able to reason in game theoretic terms. Notice that this procedure does not allow us
to answer whether individuals have social preferences but only helps us to identify a class
of games in which whether they have social preferences or not, the equilibrium prediction is
reasonably accurate. Therefore the game theoretic part of the hypothesis is not rejected in a
context in which we would not expect social preferences to inuence behaviour.
Our experiment was specically designed to discriminate between the predictions of the
L1, L2 and D1 models and equilibrium. We have shown that even if these models have
proven more successful in predicting the outcome of simple games with very similar strategic
characteristics, here their prediction is much less accurate. This seems to suggest that other
game characteristics such as whether games are constant sum, which numbers are used to
represent playo¤s or how beliefs are elicited may inuence how subjects play and belief other
play games. Therefore, although we can not discard that there may exist a model that
better explains behaviour in a more extensive class of games, we can not either discard the
hypothesis that subjects may reason di¤erently when these game characteristics are changed.
Constant sum games seem like a good starting point to study how subjects reason in
simple games as issues like fairness and e¢ ciency concerns seem not to a¤ect their choices.
However, this comes with the added cost of not being able to separate minimax or maximin
from Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium choices. Further research studying
the class of games for which equilibrium predictions are reasonably accurate should prove
promising.
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Game 1R Game 1C
L C R L C R
U 1,9 2,6 4,3 U 10,2 2,10 7,11
M 4,4 5,4 5,4 M 7,3 6,4 7,10
D 7,3 7,5 6,8 D 6,6 1,7 9,8
Game 2R Game 2C
L C R L C R
U 6,6 4,8 4,9 U 11,1 1,8 7,5
M 4,8 11,3 3,5 M 4,8 4,8 1,11
D 1,10 10,6 3,8 D 6,5 5,7 2,5
Game 3R Game 3C
L C R L C R
U 6,6 7,8 2,4 U 6,1 2,8 4,2
M 2,8 1,10 4,6 M 7,1 10,4 9,7
D 3,9 3,9 11,5 D 5,1 11,3 5,5
Game 4R Game 4C
L C R L C R
U 4,3 2,8 8,11 U 5,6 2,3 7,2
M 6,6 11,1 5,7 M 4,4 10,3 7,2
D 10,8 4,3 9,2 D 2,7 1,8 8,1
Game NR Game NC
L C R L C R
U 8,6 2,6 1,11 U 3,10 5,5 3,9
M 4,6 7,6 3,6 M 4,9 2,9 4,9
D 2,7 2,5 4,4 D 9,5 3,8 2,7
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